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- Hacker News
- My approach is to ask Claude to plan anything beyond a trivial change and I review the plan, then let it run unsupervised to execute the plan. But I guess this does still leave me vulnerable to prompt injection if part of the plan is accessing external contentby igor47
- Just don’t think about it too much. You’ll be fine.by ares623
- What guarantees do you have it will actually follow the stated plan instead of doing something else entirely?by abathologist
- claude condom gives you protection on claude YOLO modeby burgerquizz
- By default can still read anything, including all secrets in .env files, kubernetes credentials etcby croemer
- I've been thinking about this a bit.
I reckon something lie Qubes could work fairly well.
Create a new Qube and have control over network connectivity, and do everything there, at the end copy the work out and destroy it.
by stuaxo - The sandbox idea seems nice, it's just a question of how annoying it is in practice. For example the "Claude Code on the web" sandbox appears to prevent you from loading `https://api.github.com/repos/.../releases/latest`. Presumably that's to prevent you from doing dangerous GitHub API operations with escalated privileges, which is good, but it's currently breaking some of my setup scripts....by lacker
- Is that with their default environment?
I have been running a bunch of stuff in there with a custom environment that allows "*"
by simonw - sandbox-exec isn't really deprecated. It's just a tiny wrapper around some semi-private undocumented APIs, it says that because it's not intended for public use. If it were actually deprecated Apple would have deleted it at some point, or using it would trigger a GUI warning, or it'd require a restricted entitlement.
The reason they don't do that is because some popular and necessary apps use it. Like Chrome.
However, I tried this approach too and it's the wrong way to go IMHO, quite beyond the use of undocumented APIs. What you actually want to do is virtualize, not sandbox.
by mike_hearn - Fun fact: the sandboxing rules are defined using scheme!by krackers
- I don't understand why people advocate so strongly for `--dangerously-skip-permissions`.
Setting up "permissions.allow" in `.claude/settings.local.json` takes minimal time. Claude even lets you configure this while approving code, and you can use wildcards like "Bash(timeout:*)". This is far safer than risking disasters like dropping a staging database or deleting all unstaged code, which Claude would do last week, if I were running it in the YOLO mode.
The worst part is seeing READMEs in popular GitHub repos telling people to run YOLO mode without explaining the tradeoffs. They just say, "Run with these parameters, and you're all good, bruh," without any warning about the risks.
I wish they could change the parameter to signify how scary it can be, just like React did with React.__SECRET_INTERNALS_DO_NOT_USE_OR_YOU_WILL_BE_FIRED (https://github.com/reactjs/react.dev/issues/3896)
by jampa - changing the parameter name to something scary will only increase its usageby bdangubic
- I tried this path. The issue is that agents are very creating in coming up with new variations. "uv run pytest", "python3 -m pytest", "bash -c pytest"
It's a never ending game of whitelisting.
by dist-epoch - We've been exploring libseccomp/BPF filters on top of bubblewrap namespaces for LLM sandboxing - the BPF layer lets you go beyond read-only mounts to syscall restrictions. Open to collaboration on pushing this further: https://github.com/corv89/shannotby corv
- I like the best of both worlds approach of asking Claude to refine a spec with me (specifically instructing it to ask me questions) and then summarize an implementation or design plan (this might be a two step process if the feature is big enough)
When I’m satisfied with the spec, I turn on “allow all edits” mode and just come back later to review the diff at the end.
I find this works a lot better than hoping I can one shot my original prompt or having to babysit the implementation the whole way.
by boredtofears - I recommend trying a more capable model that will read much more context too when creating specs. You can load a lot of full files into GPT 5 Pro and have it produce a great spec and give more surgical direction to CC or Codex (which don’t read full files and often skip over important info in their haste). If you have it provide the relevant context for the agent, the agent doesn’t waste tokens gathering it itself and will proceed to its work.by wahnfrieden
- > That way the worst that can happen is someone else’s computer getting owned.
That way the worst thing that can happen is that you later (accidentally) trust the result of that work.
by yencabulator - Anyone from the Cursor world already YOLO's it by default.
A massive productivity boost I get is using to do server maintenance.
Using gcloud compute ssh, log into all gh runners and run docker system prune, in parellel for speed and give me a summary report of the disk usage after.
This is an undocumented and underused feature of basic agentic abilities. It doesn't have to JUST write code.
by almosthere - Does Cursor have a good sandboxing story?by simonw
- Is this what ansible does? Or some other classic ops tool?by normie3000
- by manmal
- There are a million different tools that are designed to do this, e.g. this task (log into a bunch of machines and execute a specific command without any additional tools running on each node) is literally the design use case for Ansible. It would be a simple playbook, why are you bringing AI into this at all?by mandevil
- I don't quite go this far, but I do use Claude/Codex to write Ansible playbooks/roles/collections that then do this kind of thing.
It is very easy to see what actions are being taken from the code produced, and then one gets a tool that can be used over and over again.
You can then also put these into mise tasks, because mise is great too.
by adamcharnock - Yeah totally setting it lose on your home lab is quite an eye opener. It’ll tip up recovery scripts diagnose hung systems figure out root causes of driver bugs; Linux has never been so user friendly!
Bonus points I finally have permissions sorted out on my samba share haha …
(For years I was befuddled by samba config)
by psyclobe - Yesterday I was trying to move a backend system to a new AWS account and it wasn’t working. I asked Claude Code to figure it out. About 15 minutes and 40 aws CLI commands later, it did! Turned out the API Gateway’s VPCLink needed a security group added, because the old account’s VPC had a default egress rule and the new one’s didn’t.
I barely understand what I just said, and I’m sure it would have taken me a whole day to track this down myself.
Obviously I did NOT turn on auto-approve for the aws command during this process! But now I’m making a restricted role for CC to use in this situation, because I feel like I’ll certainly be doing something like this again. It’s like the AWS Q button, except it actually works.
by wrs - I guess it's great if you don't give a shit about code quality, particularly in a larger project.
What I see are three tiny little projects that do one thing.
That is boring. We already know the LLMs are good at that.
Let's see it YOLO into a larger codebase with protocols and a growing feature set without making a complete mess of things.
So far CC has been great for letting me punch above my weight but the few times I let it run unattended it has gone against conventions clearly established in AGENTS.md and I wasn't there to keep it on the straight and narrow. So a bunch more time had to be spent untangling the mess it created.
by pdntspa - Yeah I don't know if this is a skill issue on my part, the nature of my projects, the limits of Sonnet vs. Opus, or a combination of all of the above, but my experiences track with all of yours.
From the article:
> The default mode requires you to pay constant attention to it, tracking everything it does and actively approving changes and actions every few steps.
I've never seen a YOLO run that doesn't require me to pay constant attention to it. Within a few minutes, Claude will have written bizarre abstractions, dangerous delegations of responsibility, and overall the smelliest code you'll see outside of a coding bootcamp. And god help you if you have both client and server code within the same repo. In general Claude seems to think that it's fine to wreak havoc in existing code, for the purpose of solving whatever problem is immediately at hand.
Claude has been very helpful to me, but only with constant guidance. Believe me, I would very much like to YOLO my problems away without any form of supervision. But so far, the only useful info I've received is to 1) only use it for side projects/one-off tools, and 2) make sure to run it in a sandbox. It would be far more useful to get an explanation for how to craft a CLAUDE.md (or, more generally, get the right prompt) that results in successful YOLO runs.
by Zarathruster - So let me get this straight. You’re writing tens of thousands of lines of code that will presumably go into a public GitHub repository and/or be served from some location. Even if it only runs locally on your own machine, at some point you’ll presumably give that code network access. And that code is being developed (without much review) by an agent that, in our threat model, has been fully subverted by prompt injection?
Sandboxing the agent hardly seems like a sufficient defense here.
- What is your worst case scenario from this?by simonw
- Where did "without much review" come from? I don't see that in the deck.by tptacek