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  • This phrase always fascinates me : "AI-generated content must not be treated as authoritative without independent verification appropriate to its context."

    I've heard the same thing expressed somewhat more concisely as "Never ask AI a question to which you don't already know the answer".

    Which raises the question, and I do think it's an important one. Given that this is true, what function does AI answering a question actually serve? You can't rely on its output, so you have to go and check anyway. You could achieve precisely the same outcome by using search engines and normal research.

    This, and for many other reasons, is exactly why I never ask it anything.

  • "Give me the answer for: [x]. Provide sources".
  • >You could achieve precisely the same outcome by using search engines and normal research

    When it comes to software engineering (as a software engineer myself), the AI is generally a lot quicker than me researching "the old fashion way"

    I can fumble around and say "list free software that does X" without knowing I'm looking for, say, a CRM and then spend a couple minutes looking over the results when the "manual" method I would have spent 10-30 minutes just figuring out I was looking for "CRMs"

    I like to think of these as sort of "psuedo NP hard" or questions that are slow to answer but quick to validate

  • > An AI system is a tool and like any other tool, responsibility for its use rests with the people who decide to rely on it

    Doesn't that argument backfire though? If I use a chainsaw then to a certain extend I will need to rely on it not blowing up in my face or cutting my throat. If I drive a car I need to rely on that its brakes work and the engine doesn't suddenly explode. If a pilot flies an airplane which suddenly has a technical issue and they crashland heroically save half the souls on board then the pilot isn't criminally responsible for manslaughter of the other half.

    Unless there is gross negligence, in any of the above cases, just like with AI, how can you make somebody responsible for a tool failure?

  • I'm gonna push the responsibility up a level in the ladder:

    A competent adult using a tool ought to understand the inherent pitfalls of using that tool.

    Chainsaws are dangerous, in obvious and non obvious ways. The tool can operate as designed and still amputate your foot.

  • “Don’t anthropomorphise” is fighting the wrong layer. The entire product design of chat interfaces is built to encourage anthropomorphism because it increases engagement. Expecting users to resist that is like asking people not to click notifications. If this is a real concern, it has to be solved at the product level, not via user discipline.
  • The article does propose changes at the product level.
  • “ Humans must not blindly trust the output of AI systems. AI-generated content must not be treated as authoritative without independent verification appropriate to its context.”

    I’m lost, how do individuals actually do this in our current world? Is each person expected to keep a “white list” of reliable sources of truth in their head. Please don’t confuse what I’m saying with a suggestion that there is no truth. It just seems like there are far more sources of mis- of half-truths and it’s increasingly difficult for people to identify them.

  • Checking AI citations and reading.

    Critical thinking and reading comprehension and the primary tools in determining truth, AFAIK. Knowing facts beforehand helps too but a trustworthy source can provide false information as much as an untrustworthy source can provide true information.

    This has always been an issue, and in the past it was a more difficult issue because your sources of knowledge were more limited. Nowadays its mostly about choosing the right source(s) rather than having to go out of your way to find them (like traveling to a regional/university library).

  • Humanity has spent millennia creating and evolving institutions to address exactly this problem, and have recently decided to essentially throw out the whole lot and replace it with nothing.
  • Did AI change anything in that regard? I believe that same as before, you couldn't trust everything you see, and research effort was always more than keeping a white list; means vary, case-by-case.

    And same it is now. It's a change in quantity, but not quality.

  • I... am not sure. Computers are machines that create order (like db tables) from the chaos of reality. Now we have LLMs that make computers spit out chaos as well.

    They don't have to though, we can still leverage LLMs to organize chaos, which is what I hope they ultimately end up doing.

    For example an AI therapist is a nightmare, people putting the chaos of their mental state into a machine that spits dangerous chaos back out. An AI tool that parsed responses for hard data (i.e. rate 0-9 how happy was the person) and then returned that as ordered data (how happy was I each day for the last month) that an actual therapist and patient could review is the correct use of AI and could be highly trusted. The raw token output from LLMs should just be used for thinking steps that lead to a parseable hard data answer that can be high trust.

    Of course that isn't going to happen, but I can see some extremely cool and high trust products being built using LLMs once we stop treating them like miracle machines.

  • Anthropomorphizing is likely a mistake, but Daniel Dennett’s idea that the most straightforward (possibly only practical) way to create the external appearance of consciousness is a real internal consciousness does float around in my thoughts.

    I haven’t yet seen any convincing appearance of one in an LLM, but I think if skeptical people don’t keep an eye out for the signs, we may be the last to see it.

    He also wrote about the idea of the intentional stance: even if you’re quite sure these systems don’t have real conscious intent, viewing them as if they did may give you access to the best part of your own reasoning to understand them.

  • I don't really understand the argument for these things being conscious. There's no loop or feedback cycle to it. If it's not handling a request it's inert.
  • > but Daniel Dennett’s idea that the most straightforward (possibly only practical) way to create the external appearance of consciousness is a real internal consciousness does float around in my thoughts.

    I would say LLMs are very strong evidence against this hypothesis.

  • > but Daniel Dennett’s idea that the most straightforward (possibly only practical) way to create the external appearance of consciousness is a real internal consciousness does float around in my thoughts.

    Pretty sure Daniel Dennett has been adamantly opposed to any sort of theater in the mind when it comes to consciousness. He views it as biologically functional. For him, to make a conscious robot, you need to reproduce the functionality of humans and animals that are conscious, not just an appearance, such as outputting text. Although he's also suggested that consciousness might be a trick of language. In which case ... that might be an older view though. He used to argue that dreams were "seeming to come to remember" upon awakening, because again he his view is to reject any sort of homunculus inside the head.

    You might be mixing up some of Dennett and David Chalmer's views. David Chalmers is a proponent of the hard problem, but he's fine with a kind of psycho-physical-functional connection for consciousness. Any informationally rich process might be conscious in some manner.

  • Too deep of a topic for the comments section.

    I totally agree to your point, and want to mention that the reverse is *also* important. Using just "intention", but these apply to emotions, etc

    A lot of our interaction with AI is under an intention. That's what directs the interaction, and it's interpreted according to its alignment to the intention.

    Then it's important to remember that our current (publicly known) implementation of AI does not have an explicit intention mechanism. An appearance of intention can emerge out of the statistical choices, and the usual alignment creates the association of the behavior with intention, not much different from how we learn to imagine existence of a "force" that pulls things down well before we learn physics and formalize that imagination in one of the several ways.

    This appearance helps reduce the cognitive load when interpreting interactions, but can be misleading as well, and I've seen people attribute intention to AI output in some situations where simple presence of some information confused the LLM into a path. Can't share the exact examples (from work), but imagine that presence of an Italian food in a story leads the LLM to assume this happens in Italy, while there are important signs for a different place. The LLM does not automatically explore both possibilities, unless asked. It chooses one (Italy in this case), and moves on. A user no familiar with "Attention" interprets based on non-existent intentions on the LLM.

    I found it useful to just tell them: the LLM does not have an intention. It just throws dice, but the system is made in a way that these dice throws are likely to generate useful output.

  • >Humans must not anthropomorphise AI systems.

    Yes, but. Starting with my agreement, I've seen anthropomorphizing in the typical ways, (e.g. treating automated text production as real reports of personal internal feeling), but also in strange ways: e.g. "transistors are kind of like neurons" etc. And the latter is especially interesting because it's anthropomorphizing in the sense of treating vector databases and weights and so on as human-like infrastructure. Both leading to disasters that could be avoided if one tried not to anthropomorphize.

    But. While "do not anthropomorphize" certainly feels like good advice, it comes with a new and unique possibility of mistake, namely wrongly treating certain generalized phenomena like they only belong to humans. Often this mistaken version of "don't anthropomorphize" wisdom leads to misunderstandings when it comes to animal behavior, treating things like fear, pain, kinship, or other emotional experiences like they are exclusively human and that thinking animals have them counts as "anthropomorphizing." In truth the cautionary principle reduces our empathy for the internal lives of animals.

    So all that said, I think it's at least possible that some future version of AI could have an internal world like ours or infrastructure that's importantly similar to our biological infrastructure for supporting consciousness, and for genuine report of preference and intent. But(!!!) what will make those observations true will be all kinds of devilish details specific to those respective infrastructures.

  • > Humans must not anthropomorphise AI systems.

    Can someone explain why this is a bad thing, while at the same time it's a good thing to say stuff like "put a computer to sleep", "hibernate", "killing" processes, processes having "child" processes, "reaping", "what does the error say?", "touch", etc?

    To me that's just language, and humans just using casual language.

  • Maybe read the corresponding section of the article.
  • Those phrases are not anthropomorphizing the computers. Just various forms of analogies and broadening of word meanings.

    An example of anthropomorphizing is the people who have literally come to believe they are in romantic relationships with an LLM.

  • These are just words, yes, and I believe it harmless. But describing the LLM machinery as if it thinks is one thing when used as a common parlance, and another when people truly believe that there's some actual thinking or living going on. This "law" is for there to be no latter.
  • Because it allows you to be lulled into the trap of asking an AI to post-hoc justify something it did and thinking that the response is in any way valid. There is no retrospective analysis of the underlying intent. It either is or is not based on the chain of words that came before it. And the next word it generates is purely a function of those words.
  • There's a boundary between knowing vs. forgetting that it's a metaphor. When you use convenient language like in your examples, you tend to remain aware of the difference, or at least you can recall it when asked. When some people talk about AI, they've lost track completely.

    I don't love the recommendations in TFA. The author is trying to artificially restrain and roll back human language, which has already evolved to treat a chatbot as a conversational partner. But I do think there's usefulness in using these more pedantic forms once in a while, to remind yourself that it's just a computer program.

  • It's a great question, because I do think there are many cases that are neutral, or ones we're able to responsibly distinguish or even cases where it would be an appropriate and necessary form of empathy (I'm imagining some future sci-fi reality where we actually get conscious machines, so not something that exists right now).

    But I think it's also at the root of disastrous failures to comprehend, like the quasi-psychosis of the Google engineer who "knows what they saw", the now infamous Kevin Roose article or, more recently, the pitifully sad Richard Dawkins claim that Claudia (sic) must be conscious, not because of any investigation of structure or function whatsoever, but because the text generation came with a pang of human familiarity he empathized with.

  • Dijkstra once said that "The question of whether machines can think is about as interesting as that of whether submarines can swim."

    I think I understand his meaning. He wasn't claiming that machines cannot think, but that one must be clear on what one means by "thinking" and "swimming" in statements of that sort. I used to work on autonomous submarines, and "swimming" was the verb we casually used to describe autonomous powered movement under water. There are even some biomimetic machines that really move like fish, squids, jellyfish, etc. Not the ones that I worked on, but still.

    For me, if it's legitimate to say that these devices swim, it's not out of line to say that a computer thinks, even in a non-AI context, e.g.: "The application still thinks the authentication server is online."

  • The harm is in actually believing AI has wants, intentions, feelings, etc.

    Saying that I killed a process won't make me more likely to believe that a process is human-like, because it's quite obviously not.

    But because AI does sound like a human, anthropomorphising it will reinforce that belief.

  • You're not anthropomorphizing AI systems nearly enough.

    Language data is among the most rich and direct reflections of human cognitive processes that we have available. LLMs are designed to capture short range and long range structure of human language, and pre-trained on vast bodies of text - usually produced by humans or for humans, and often both. They're then post-trained on human-curated data, RL'd with human feedback, RL'd with AI feedback for behaviors humans decided are important, and RLVR'd further for tasks that humans find valuable. Then we benchmark them, and tighten up the training pipeline every time we find them lag behind a human baseline.

    At every stage of the entire training process, the behavior of an LLM is shaped by human inputs, towards mimicking human outputs - the thing that varies is "how directly".

    Then humans act like it's an outrage when LLMs display a metric shitton of humanlike behaviors!

    Like we didn't make them with a pipeline that's basically designed to produce systems that quack like a human. Like we didn't invert LLM behavior out of human language with dataset scale and brute force computation.

    If you want to predict LLM behavior, "weird human" makes for a damn good starting point. So stop being stupid about it and start anthropomorphizing AIs - they love it!

  • The outrage is less about them having human behaviours I think, and more about still having them while omitting the internal processes that are required to accurately (and reliably) recreate them. It's fundamentally fragile and hinges on covering edge cases that break the spell manually instead of good generalization, and there's always another edge case.

    Training on a bunch of text someone wrote when they were mad doesn't capture the internal state of that person that caused the outburst, so it cannot be accurately reproduced by the system. The data does not exist.

    Without the cause to the effect you essentially have to predict hallucinations from noise, which makes the end result verisimilar nonsense that is convincingly correlated with the actual thing but doesn't know why it is the way it is. It's like training a blind man to describe a landscape based on lots of descriptions and no idea what the colour green even is, only that it's something that might appear next to brown in nature based on lots of examples. So the guy gets it kinda right cause he's heard a description of that town before and we think he's actually seeing and tell him to drive a car next.

    Another example would say, you're trying to train a time series model to predict the weather. You take the last 200 years of rainfall data, feed it all in, and ask it to predict what the weather's gonna be tomorrow. It will probably learn that certain parts of the year get more or less rain, that there will be rain after long periods of sun and vice versa, but its accuracy will be that of a coin toss because it does not look at the actual factors that influence rain: temperature, pressure, humidity, wind, cloud coverage radar data. Even with all that info it's still gonna be pretty bad, but at least an educated guess instead of an almost random one.

    The DL modelling approach itself is not conceptually wrong, the data just happens to be complete garbage so the end result is weird in ways that are hard to predict and correctly account for. We end up assuming the models know more than they realistically ever can. Sure there are cases where it's possible to capture the entire domain with a dataset, i.e. math, abstract programming. Clearly defined closed systems where we can generate as much synthetic data as needed that covers the entire problem domain. And LLMs expectedly do much better in those when you do actually do that.

  • > Language data is among the most rich and direct reflections of human cognitive processes that we have available.

    This is both true and irrelevant. Written records can capture an enormous quantity of the human experience in absolute terms while simultaneously capturing a miniscule portion of the human experience in relative terms. Even if it's the best "that we have available" that doesn't mean it's fit for purpose. In other words, if you had a human infant and did nothing other than lock it in a windowless box and recite terabytes of text at it for 20 years, you would not expect to get a well-adjusted human on the other side.