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  • Has anyone here considered the cost of capital reserves required by the bank for holding this loan? Commercial loans used to be a 100% capital holding requirement, while HVCRE (High Volatility Commercial Real Estate) Loans carry 150% capital holding. So if a bank loans a building owner 100% of a 20 million dollar facility and it meets HVCRE requirements, the bank has to keep 30 million of capital in reserve for the chance of default. Even if the loan receives enough buyer downpayment or for some other reason becomes normal Commercial loan the bank has to hold 20 million in reserve capital for the loan. So you have to net the incentive of the cost of the capital held in reserve against the interest payment on the bank's balance sheet as an economic forcing against continuing to float the loan forever...
  • I actually think there's a business to be had here.

    As described, the landlord can't offer a traditional lease for the actual value of the space.

    However, the landlord could offer essentially day rentals without creating a lease. There are systems for this already, such as Peerspace and their ilk, which I've used for small events. I believe these don't trigger the foreclosure clauses.

    I think that a property management company managing deeply underwater buildings could play in this, reducing their cost structure by offering day rates. They've often already got a solid NFC entry system. Most of what you need is automated pricing, onboarding and offboarding, and figuring out how you avoid needing physical cleaning/setup/teardown overhead.

  • Say what you want, but a law that lets you pretend that the value of a building is based on what you ask, rather than what you can actually obtain, is a stupid law.
    by pif
  • How come this obvious workaround isn't used much more often:

    >> If the system allows you to pretend that the vacancy is temporary, why doesn’t it allow you to lower rents on the pretense that lower rents are also temporary?

    > This does happen sometimes: it’s packaged as “incentive offers,” like 50% off the first 12 or 24 months rent, or 6 months without rent, etc, that lower the average rent over the life of the lease without lowering the “list price.” That’s common in residential leases, and I know it happens sometimes in commercial leases, but I don’t know how prevalent it is.

  • The key analysis is how does the system manage the risk that a building's equilibrium rent goes down or turns out to be lower than assumed when writing the loan.

    The system described in the article is basically that the risk is not explicitly planned for, and just washes out that it is managed by a vacancy and building owners eating the cost of the vacancy.

    Any solution needs to provide a new answer for how that risk is managed, preferably one that doesn't result in foreclosures. Some possibility:

    * The bank takes on the risk, by loans having a provision for writing down value if rents have to drop. This is tricky, because if the operator decides when rents need to be revised down, they have no incentive to protect the bank's position. If the bank decides, then they have no incentive to ever accept a rent drop, they'd rather force the operator to eat the vacancy. You'd need some trigger like duration of vacancies.

    * The operator takes on the risk but with a mechanism for lowering the rent. I can't really figure out a way this would work without requiring the operator to have capital on hand though.

    * The risk is insured. If rents need to drop then insurance pays the write-down in property value. I'm not sure any insurance company would be able to take this business though, as it is highly correlated between customers. A downturn would just wipe-out the insurer.

  • Oh my goodness, thank you. My wife had to move her store in 2020 in the midst of lockdown; you'd think rents would have been low, but no. Since then, many of the places that wouldn't lower the rent then, have sat empty ever since. This is in Austin, TX, a town that has had a healthy economy during that entire time.

    Weirder still, many of them were on the market, theoretically for rent, but if you called them up it turned out they weren't actually available, and the landlord wasn't interested in renting them. I couldn't figure out why you would pretend something was for rent at $X, and let it sit empty for years, rather than actually rent it at something <$X. Now it makes sense.

  • This explanation seems very implausible to me. By lowering the rent by X%, and therefore reducing annual revenue by X%, you admit the building is worth X% less. But by leaving the building X% vacant, also reducing the annual income stream by X%, you and the bank can somehow pretend the building is worth what it would be if full? I doubt owners and banks actually believe this. Is there some policy that forces this?
  • Article is from 2025, and "extend and pretend" is coming unglued.[1] Extend and pretend was big around 2024.[2]

    The other side of this is that landlords hate to reduce rent to rent vacant spaces because their paying tenants will demand rent reductions or move. That can crash the rental market. A building half rented at rent X is more profitable than a building fully rented at rent 0.5 X.

    [1] https://propmodo.com/the-end-of-extend-and-pretend/

    [2] https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr1130

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