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  • Hacker News
  • I have to say, the principle that open-source software can't do anything nefarious because the source is open just hasn't held up for a lot of reasons -- including that nobody has the time to inspect the code, let alone ensure that it matches the binaries; and also that GitHub has become a distribution hub for software used by lots of people with no ability or interest in auditing the software they use.
  • I think that this is becoming increasingly true only for large, well-known repositories, where the maintainers have a lot to lose by doing anything shady. I don't think the React team could get away with doing something like that, for example.
  • Ironically, one of the promises of AI: enough eyeballs.

    The catch is the eyeballs can also be used to generate exploits.

  • Never heard of that principle. I have heard people say that if an open source project was doing something nefarious it would be easier for someone to discover it.
  • > I have to say, the principle that open-source software can't do anything nefarious because the source is open

    No is saying this. I think you have misunderstood the principles of open source. I'd rather be able to verify the code i am running, then it being locked down, propreitery.

    I have the possibilty to audit FOSS. Cant do it for propreitery software

  • The problem the article is describing seems to have little to do with open source. There were GitHub repositories that had links added in their READMEs to a zip file containing compiled binaries.

    GitHub is not a curated software repository. It's essentially no different from some random stranger linking to some binaries on a forum. (There are communities that seem to have no concerns about running unknown binaries from strangers in forum threads, but I wouldn't recommend it.)

    by ptx
  • The choice is between code you can validate and code you can't, not code that has malware and code that doesn't.
  • > the principle that open-source software can't do anything nefarious because the source is open just hasn't held up for a lot of reasons

    You've been living on such a principle? That sounds insane, why would something not be nefarious just because you can read the code?

    The way I was "raised" by FOSS greybeards screaming at me through web forums, was that any software available on 3rd party websites anyone can upload anything to, will be filled with viruses and malware, and this was early 2000s. Surely people still advocate for this mindset today, when it's even more likely?

  • Same thing happened to one of my repos in Feb. I wrote up the details with screenshots.

    https://reducibl.com/writing/someone-used-my-repo-to-distrib...

  • Did Github ever do anything?
  • Thanks for the writing, which would have been even better had it been written by a human.
  • Thank you. I've added a link to your article in my article.
  • This is just one flavour of abuse. GitHub does NOT give a shit about the scale of the malware problem.

    I've seen so many forms of malware repos working on a GitHub trends newsletter [1], mostly about crypto, NFTs, KMS, and similar stuff.

    In the first runs of the project, I was so surprised by tens of malware repos that looked like trending repos. A lot of them share some common traits that made filtering feasible:

    - Made by a fresh GitHub user - many created in the past few days.

    - The average creation date of Stargazers accounts is very close to the repo creation date. If you take the mean time diff, those bad repos get exposed.

    I reported 10s of malware repos, but then I gave up as I felt GitHub was not really doing enough to fight back. I was like... these guys don't seem to care, why should I?

    God knows how many people have been abused by these malware repos on GitHub.

    ---

    [1] https://github.com/mhadidg/gh-trends

  • Most of HN doesn't give a shit about the malware problem. They will happily click "Give XYZ App ... permission to act on your behalf" to all of their repos with zero knowledge of what permissions are being requested. Github's Auth system doesn't tell the user what permissions are being requested

    Note: Github has 2 auth systems. OAuth, and Github Auth. OAuth lists permissions but most apps use Github Auth which does not. So that app that gives you a badge or lets you comment could asking for write permission all your repos. You have no idea.

  • I have no idea of the kind of investment this would take in terms of time and money, but is it beyond the realms of possibility to run code submitted to GitHub through a basic filter? Genuine question - I have no experience of systems at that scale. But the fact that Microsoft is able to replace URLs in emails with ones that redirect through their systems so they can block malware URLs makes me feel like it should be possible.
  • If most malware repos are created in the last few days by a fresh user, then it sounds like GitHub is taking action against them? Or where are the old ones?
  • This is the problem with software/services being taken over by big entities: they no longer have to care under the umbrella of "too big to fail".
  • I uploaded several of these virus-infected archives to VirusTotal. In each archive, under the “Network Communication” section, the virus makes requests to three resources: a GET request to a website to retrieve IP information, a POST request to a Polygon RPC node (drpc), and a POST request to what appears to be the virus creator’s server. I can only assume that the scheme is designed to steal cryptocurrency.
  • > I typed the project name into Google, and my repository appeared in the results. I entered the same query into Bing, and someone else’s repository appeared in the results

    Side story, this kind of thing is what made me stop using Bing.

    I had been using it as the default for searches (it sucks, but it's at least not Google), until I landed on a phishing page for my bank (I haven't committed it to memory yet). The page was a near perfect copy, and I would easily have gotten pwnd by it if they didn't have a modal asking me to run some code in my terminal for "security activation" that made me go "that's a little odd... Is this the right address OH SHIT that's a .ru domain"

    I never see Google return phishing pages or typo squatters in the first page. Bing constantly returns that stuff in the first several results.

  • speaking only to search quality: try Kagi.
  • Why would you go to your bank by first searching for it? Sounds very insecure to me. I type my banks url directly instead, or if that gets tedious, store it as a bookmark.

    I know several people who search for important sites, click uncritically on links, and get scammed. This is not so good.

  • >I never see Google return phishing pages or typo squatters in the first page

    Our company constantly has phishing copies of our real pages as first results in Google. We have no ability to get them taken down. It costs us serious money every year, and hurts our customers who get swindled because Google lets some brand new domain registered yesterday come before the company that has existed for 20 years.

    If you haven't seen it on google, you aren't looking hard enough.

  •     at least not Google
    
    Is one giant mega-corp better than any other?

    You're going to have a hard time convincing me the answer is yes.

  • > I never see Google return phishing pages

    Maybe you're not looking or maybe you're lucky.

    Either way, many of us see it happen all the time there too. For GitHub especially, I almost never get the canonical repo for a project in my Google results. Phishing or innocuous, it's almost always some fork at the top and then a bunch of non-github.com sites.

    Search is more or less "cooked" now, as they say. Google vs Bing vs DDG vs Kagi is mostly in the noise.

  • This is where password managers are useful because they would refuse to fill in login information since the domain doesn't match
  • I've seen it many times on google where the phishing sites were advertised results stickied above the results they impersonate.

    Another good reason to use ublock origin!

  • I reported a repo containing obvious nulled software to GitHub in February 2024.

    The title is "nulled WHMCS" and it's a full copy of that software with copy protection removed. It couldn't be more cut and dried.

    The repo is still there 2+ years later and GitHub has taken no action.

    If GitHub can't respond to tickets pointing out obvious pirated software, I don't think they care about anything anyone puts up.

  • GitHub is so close to becoming SourceForge. In order to become the scum-infested cesspool it truly longs to be, Microsoft needs to relentlessly serve ads on GitHub. Then, the cycle will once again be complete.

    I can't wait to discover the next thing to be disappointed by in a decade's time.

  • It happened a few times to me that I'd find some very well constructed scam scheme (cryptocurrency washing systems, web platform/phishing scams), then I'd research deeper into it to see how it worked, just to ultimately feel powerless not knowing what to do with the information.
  • It's a matter of how much effort you want to put in, and what you get out of it.

    Years ago, a friend of mine fell victim to a romance scam. Damage ~€3k. It involved fake websites of non-existing logistics companies, a fake banking site where victim could 'help' a person 'transfer funds' for them, a long chat history (over Viber or something like that, initiated through Facebook), etc.

    This being a good friend, I put in some legwork, saved local copies of sites, etc. Some findings:

    # It's easy to find copies of sites of the one(s) used to defraud victim. In this case, ~50. And compile a list, what's the hoster of each & where domains are registered.

    # Fake banking sites are easy to determine since legitimate banks are recorded in per-country registries. Legitimate: website's security certificate (extended validation etc) indicates [bank_X], bank_X listed as such in registry of country it operates in. Not? -> fake.

    For non-banking fake sites it's more difficult to tell.

    # Hosting companies & domain registrars do take action. As long as you provide correct & detailed info, in such a way that it's easy for them to act on. Professional companies don't like having legal / financial liabilities sit around.

    # If there's security certificates involved, informing issuer of that can remove "secure connection" from a whole batch of sites in 1 go. Makes it harder to convince future victims. (no lock icon on a banking site?!?)

    # An official request could be filed with this victim's bank (passed on to recipient's bank), that would give holder of recipient account 2 options: a) return the funds, or b) have their personal details revealed to victim - for use in legal proceedings etc.

    This was within EU area. Likely, recipient would be a money mule & not respond. But then you'd get money mule's full name/contact info etc (home address?)

    # Police / fraud orgs etc rarely have time for this. You need to do the legwork yourself.

    Ultimately, my friend decided not to pursue the matter. But in the mean time, I had caused >2/3 of those fake sites to be deleted (and all the fake banking sites I'd found), and some security certificates to be revoked. Obviously that disrupts scammer's operations to some degree (and costs them time, $$, potential victims dropped etc). So it's not like you can't do anything.