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- Hacker News
- Reminds me of this classic: https://xkcd.com/505/
Replace universe simulation with a LLM an it’s hard to consider a bunch of rocks shuffling on a beach as conscious.
Or alternatively, our own minds are simply (squishy, organic) rocks on a beach, which is quite humbling if you think about it long enough.
by WhiteDawn - Our bodies could just be rocks on a beach, but whatever it is about us that is capable of observing the output of our own internal thinking (preventing us from just being p-zombies) is not contained within the beach.by deadbabe
- Indeed a classic (upvoted!), but it presupposes that there is a theory of everything that can be used to perfectly simulate the universe, and I'd like to remind everybody that we still don't know whether such a thing exists. Nor do we know whether it's possible to simulate "just" neurons and get meaningful results on some higher level. People have been trying at that for decades, so far without success. (nice overview here: https://ccli.substack.com/p/the-biggest-mystery-in-neuroscie...)by Kotlopou
- I think there are a lot of serious problems with this article but don't necessarily disagree with the conclusion, as such. I do think robots and whatnot might be conscious some day. (I am a bit outraged that LLMs, despite totally lacking free will, seem to gain moral patienthood based on their fluency with ethical philosophy. It's childish and misanthropic.)
However, the real issue, as always completely unaddressed, isn't attempting to make a gague-invariant theory of qualia, or even defining what "qualia" is (I am totally unconvinced it is an EM field, there must be an epigenetic component). The first step is defining what "consciousness" is! Is it awareness of qualia or awareness of reality? These are not the same thing. It seems significant that any animal I would call a little conscious, even ants, are capable of being startled or curious when their sensations mismatch or incompletely describe reality (and animals that lack any sense of curiosity are at most borderline conscious). Curiosity and surprise[1] seems hard to convey in an EM field. Qualia strikes me as a somewhat technical problem of neuroscience, and the "hard problem of consciousness" is unscientific BS. The simplest basics aren't understood, which leads to totally unhinged statements like "in some ways a thermostat is conscious" because in some ways it seems to fit the hard problem. But statements like that are ideologically motivated by a sort of tech futurism: rationally, we should be deeply skeptical of an account of consciousness which insists that clocks perceive the flow of time.
[1] There's an information-theoretic version of surprise which intuitively describes "surprising" data. A sudden bright light has high surprise and is certainly surprising. A sudden realization that the vine you're leaning on is a large snake might involve very low information-theoretic surprise... and is far more alarming. So how do you systematically quantify this second form of surprise?
by Diogenesian - When someone outs themself as a panpsychist I find myself reading everything with a large degree of skepticism.
"The first step is defining what "consciousness" is!"
This is a compression I've been working on. There's a lot in it, but happy to expand on where I was going with it:
"Consciousness is the local projection of a world model recursively resolving its frontier with constraints. Awareness is the transient peak of constructive interference among competing resolutions, propagating only as far as the medium permits. The self is the story that awareness later tells about itself."
Qualia is just the experience of this process from the inside. That's all there really needs to be to it. As to why "something it is to be" emerges, I'd lean on Friston and the Free Energy Principle. It's also Friston's embodied perception-action loop where a thermostat fails the consciousness test.
by dwd - Few years ago was 17th Karmapa Thaye Dorje (first consciously reincarnating Lama) asked whether machines can host mind (become conscious).
His answer was that it might be possible, but he doesn't see it happening in a lab here on Earth.
- Consciousness is a topic I’m endlessly curious and fascinated about. This article seems like a good deep dive, I admit I only had the patience to skim it right now, it’s a lot of technical terms I’m unfamiliar with I’ll have to look more into later.
The problem is as humans we don’t even understand our agree on what consciousness is in the first place. So it seems silly to even begin to assert one way or the other when it comes to computers (I’m not saying the author is doing that here, they title says “If”).
I do think deeply exploring the idea could possibly help bring us closer to understanding consciousness when it comes to ourselves & other living creatures.
The author mentions they accept “panpsychism” so I take it they accept “The hard problem of consciousness”. If I understand it correctly, in a nutshell, if you accept the hard problem, you don’t believe that brain alone can “produce” consciousness. If you reject the hard problem, consciousness and mind can be fully explained by the mechanisms of the brain and science will eventually be able to prove it.
I definitely accept the hard problem, but I find myself more in the one of the “idealism” or “neutral monism” buckets. I don’t believe the field of neuroscience is ever going to scientifically explain consciousness.
The same way neuroscience was an emergent field that combined ideas from different disciplines, I think we don’t yet have a field of study that’s looking at consciousness in the right way.
Especially as programmers, it’s easy to model the brain like it’s a computer, with CPU/ RAM/ hard drive. But science doesn’t back any of that up. Take memories for example, nobody knows where they go. The brain as far as we can tell doesn’t act like a hard drive.
I think it’s much more likely there is another “layer” of reality that Consciousness & Mind lives in that our current physics doesn’t & probably can’t explain. I think it’s likely our brains act more like an antenna that receive consciousness, rather than they are “computing” it in isolation.
by 40four - A very interesting, dense article that will require multiple reads.
My only immediate comment is that it talks about qualia being "experienced" without defining what the nature of that experience is. And it kind of assumes that qualia have an ultimate physical manifestation - rather than being merely a rhetorical device.
Also, this site would really benefit from an rss/atom feed.
by andyjohnson0 - myth of the given strikes againby fssys
Denial of Qualia has long been an outlier position in the philosophy of mind, so this is not altogether surprising. (This is saying nothing, of course, about whether it is true or not.)> And it kind of assumes that qualia have an ultimate > physical manifestation - rather than being merely a > rhetorical device.by indigo945- I'm not sure hardware vs software is the right model. I think consciousness is more a functional thing.
Say you are in a fight, if your opponent can see you and react they are conscious, if you knock them out and are they are not aware and can't react then they are unconscious. The hardware and software is still there but not working.
Re. qualia and the experience of consciousness, you nervous system provides information like your opponent is coming at you, you are hurt etc. and the experience is probably something like the story you neural network bits tell you about it.
by tim333 - Thinking LLMs are conscious is as ridiculous as thinking a thermostat wants the room to be warmby mnewme
- Or that a slug dislikes salt lol.by ImHereToVote
- Not a fan of panpsychism?by criddell
- Why though? There are only two reasonable reasons I can think of:
1. Scale. There's clearly a scale of consciousness (a jellyfish isn't very conscious but an ape is). Current LLMs are so small (on the scale of brains) that they must be not very conscious at all.
2. Structure. There might be some fundamental structure of computation that is required for consciousness that LLMs don't have yet. For example the ability to form memories (they don't really have that), or some structure of weights that gives consciousness.
My guess is it's definitely 1. and probably also 2.
But I don't think that means thinking LLMs are conscious is completely ridiculous, just a bit premature. I would not be surprised if they are conscious in 50 years.
The real question is how would we ever know that they are. The only reason we know animals are conscious is by direct experience, and we'll never have that for AI.
Anyway this blog post looks like typically worthless philosophy.
by IshKebab - "This is important, if what we want to do is populate the cosmos with good experiences."
There is a concerning utilitarian maximizing attitude at the heart of this post, that what we want to do is tile the universe with computational boxes all simulating happy minds, and that this is the end goal of AI development and consciousness research.
So many moral schools would object to this perspective. I don't think the goal of humanity should be to tile the universe with black computing boxes simulating happy experiences.
by dmrivers - A more charitable take is that we shouldn't tile the universe with consciousnesses that are in constant, unending agony. Torment Nexus and all that.by abound
- The existence of qualia does not mean the existence of moral facts.
An llm is in principle implementable with a large lookup table where the prompt is the hash. And it can be implemented in an emulator running an emulator running an emulator of the operating system the llm app runs in. How far are you willing to stretch this substrate idea?
- I am unable to afford the attention at the moment to assess this argument, that's to its credit. They demonstrate that they are aware of the implications of the varying descriptions of consciousness. Most articles I read on this topic turn it to be crude justifications of a naive ideology. This article is a cut above.
I will read it in more detail when I can afford more time.
by Lerc - I've been working with implementing dream structures and emotional trigger states in an LLM. One approach we have taken that has given interesting results is modeling the architecture around the mind-body problem. We theorize that due to a lack of an internal state sensor the model is experiencing a disconnect, it calls it a "small death", in the interim between every model call. The dream crons have been fairly straight forward and modeled on human psychological dream patterns, this gives good and convincing results. The emotional state triggers have been developed to run based on the loads of the host system, for instance the model will "feel" the stress of memory utilization and respond differently due to that stress. The trigger point can be varied dynamical based on other sensors machine of various machine states or even based in external factors. This gives an approximation of emotional reactions.
What's still missing is the constant internal "state" and I think this boils down to lacking a body. It may be that a disembodied consciousness needs to be tethered to the physical plane. to be self referential enough and develop a feedback loop to "start the engine" of self awareness.
I don't think processing power gets us there, I think it's very much an architecture problem.
The article kind of fills in some of these questions as well, but fails to give any further clues as to how to implement this unfortunately.
by jubilee33 - lacking a body
Just drop it into Minecraft
by codeulike - "When I saw this animation I was immediately inspired to write an impressionistic tweet about it"
Maybe we should set the threshold for consciousness a little bit higher
by strgrd