Birbla

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Hacker News

I didn't see it explicitly mentioned in the post, I wonder if they filtered exclusively for domains with mx records. Because I would assume that lots of domains just don't have email configured and therefore aren't aware that you should still setup DMARC to prevent impersination of your domain.

by agotterer

I really think we should be solving a much bigger problem of the major email providers not providing an automated way of handling abuse and not caring about abuse reports at all. Most of my spam comes from the three major email providers and at this point I gave up even trying to send abuse reports because they just get ignored.

The big companies do not have to care because nobody will block Google, Microsoft or Amazon. They are too big to fail.

Spoofing a From field is an insignificant problem in comparison.

by jwr

Email has been turned into a by-the-corporation, for-the-corporation service. Corporations need DMARC so they can control email and the ability to spam. The spam I cannot block is spam from Google.

If you decide to think about this, you will quickly realize that email is f*ked and needs to be forked. Perhaps we need a Community Email Initiative that blocks corporations and only allows Community members.

Trust is the one thing you can't buy on the Corporate Internet.

I am sure many people will be offended and down vote this comment because they cannot conceptualize an internet without Corporations.

by talkingtab

The article speaks about DMARC monitoring, but not about "writing" it. So many orgs are too small to have someone paying attention of these things. Where I work, the CTO used to manage the DNS, but with very little understanding of what it all means. It was just copy and paste. And yes, it also says p=none. Probably because it was in the example. It's like setting up a website for your company, and picking some wordpress instance: how are you supposed to know the risks? It's just too much.

by tgv

If you have any domains that does not use email, it may be a good idea to set up some DNS records to prevent it being used.

DNS SPF record: mydomain.io. TXT "v=spf1 -all"

DNS DMARC: _dmarc.mydomain.io. TXT "v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; adkim=s; aspf=s"

That ought to stop anyone trying to use your domains as source.

by TheChaplain

I mind email for a number of small orgs (<1000 recipients each). There are so many SPF and DKIM failures from senders who you'd think would know better (Fortune 100-type companies). I don't want complaints from users missing messages so I end up disregarding failures even when published policy says to do otherwise.

by EvanAnderson

Sadly the article doesn't really touch on whether or not DMARC accomplishes anything truly useful. When I enabled DMARC for ingress email on one of my own mail servers, it ultimately ended up regularly blocking a handful emails from customers, yet virtually all the spam coming in had valid SPF / DKIM / DMARC, as do most of the phishing attacks.

The core problem is that the real need of email end users need is a way of determining whether or not to trust a given sender. Signatures are purely a technical measure which provides no information on the trustworthiness of the sender. The end result is that email scoring still has to be content based, and the signature check technologies are pure noise with no useful signal for the purpose of determining if an email should actually show up in my inbox.

The tech industry has a bad habit of providing solutions to problems adjacent to problems the user actually needs solved while leaving the user's actual problem unresolved.

by bcrl

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  • Hacker News
  • I didn't see it explicitly mentioned in the post, I wonder if they filtered exclusively for domains with mx records. Because I would assume that lots of domains just don't have email configured and therefore aren't aware that you should still setup DMARC to prevent impersination of your domain.
    by agotterer
  • The domains that do enforce DMARC are apparently configured so badly that the German secure email provider mailbox.org decided not to honor DMARC.

    See this thread in German: https://userforum.mailbox.org/topic/10676-mailbox-org-akzept...

    by asimops
  • I really think we should be solving a much bigger problem of the major email providers not providing an automated way of handling abuse and not caring about abuse reports at all. Most of my spam comes from the three major email providers and at this point I gave up even trying to send abuse reports because they just get ignored.

    The big companies do not have to care because nobody will block Google, Microsoft or Amazon. They are too big to fail.

    Spoofing a From field is an insignificant problem in comparison.

    by jwr
  • Email has been turned into a by-the-corporation, for-the-corporation service. Corporations need DMARC so they can control email and the ability to spam. The spam I cannot block is spam from Google.

    If you decide to think about this, you will quickly realize that email is f*ked and needs to be forked. Perhaps we need a Community Email Initiative that blocks corporations and only allows Community members.

    Trust is the one thing you can't buy on the Corporate Internet.

    I am sure many people will be offended and down vote this comment because they cannot conceptualize an internet without Corporations.

    by talkingtab
  • The article speaks about DMARC monitoring, but not about "writing" it. So many orgs are too small to have someone paying attention of these things. Where I work, the CTO used to manage the DNS, but with very little understanding of what it all means. It was just copy and paste. And yes, it also says p=none. Probably because it was in the example. It's like setting up a website for your company, and picking some wordpress instance: how are you supposed to know the risks? It's just too much.
    by tgv
  • If you have any domains that does not use email, it may be a good idea to set up some DNS records to prevent it being used.

    DNS SPF record: mydomain.io. TXT "v=spf1 -all"

    DNS DMARC: _dmarc.mydomain.io. TXT "v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; adkim=s; aspf=s"

    That ought to stop anyone trying to use your domains as source.

    by TheChaplain
  • I mind email for a number of small orgs (<1000 recipients each). There are so many SPF and DKIM failures from senders who you'd think would know better (Fortune 100-type companies). I don't want complaints from users missing messages so I end up disregarding failures even when published policy says to do otherwise.
    by EvanAnderson
  • Sadly the article doesn't really touch on whether or not DMARC accomplishes anything truly useful. When I enabled DMARC for ingress email on one of my own mail servers, it ultimately ended up regularly blocking a handful emails from customers, yet virtually all the spam coming in had valid SPF / DKIM / DMARC, as do most of the phishing attacks.

    The core problem is that the real need of email end users need is a way of determining whether or not to trust a given sender. Signatures are purely a technical measure which provides no information on the trustworthiness of the sender. The end result is that email scoring still has to be content based, and the signature check technologies are pure noise with no useful signal for the purpose of determining if an email should actually show up in my inbox.

    The tech industry has a bad habit of providing solutions to problems adjacent to problems the user actually needs solved while leaving the user's actual problem unresolved.

    by bcrl