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  • The final information on the crash almost reads like they hit the very top of the mountain - according to NTSB, they were about 200-250 ft from the summit, so it is possible they did still have visual with the airport until right before the impact. Whether or not GPS could've helped with this, I'm not sure - it might've allowed them to see where they were relative to the mountain better, since it was the middle of the night and so they probably couldn't see the mountain very well..
  • Your GPS enabled flight computer will indeed yell at you VERY LOUDLY if you're about to hit a mountain. It will not allow you to get particularly close to terrain without noticing.
  • The ridiculously criminal government of the Banana Republic of Serbia last year used this technique to prevent drones from being able to take video of a 300,000+ person protest in Belgrade. They spoofed the GPS signal to make the drones think they were flying near the Nikola Tesla Airport nearby so that they would autonomously land.

    https://ground.news/article/lazni-signali-rusili-dronove-avi...

  • The loss is tragic but I’m sorry GPS jamming was not a factor here. There was a NOTAM indicating it’s going on, the pilots should have been aware and it appears when they reached out with a request the jamming was stopped.

    It was a visual approach at a moonless night at an airport in high terrain, this was pilot error unfortunately.

  • I'll bet that the NTSB will list GPS jamming as a contributing factor. I agree with you that it's not the primary cause of the accident.
  • Luckily, aviation investigations haven't concluded with "pilot error" for over half a century, or else there would be a lot more accidents as we never fixed any of the actual causes and just blamed the dead pilots.
  • I actually experienced GPS spoofing while paragliding near Ukraine, luckily in the daytime. I don't even want to imagine it at night on a rescue mission. Condolences to the occupants.

    It's quite easy to say "no big deal" while calm in an office, but it's really different when you're busy flying and then there's the extra workload of trying to understand what's happening, attempting to fix it, and so on. Imagine "debug bug in production while driving a car" for a rough comparison, although I guess planes are probably better equipped for loss of GPS?

    https://blog.emilburzo.com/2026/06/gps-spoofing-teleported-m...

  • > At 0000:26, the ARTCC controller advised the flight crew that the airplane was at 13,000 ft msl, 1,000 ft above their assigned altitude. The pilot responded that they were correcting their altitude and that the airplane had lost GPS capability. The pilot stated they would need a heading

    > About 0005 the ARTCC operations supervisor contacted [the military] to stop jamming and at 0007:34 ADS-B data recording returned to 2-3 second intervals.

    > The flight crew again reported they “[have] a visual on Ruidoso” at 0008:30 and that they could “go visual.”

    > About 0010, the ARTCC operations supervisor informed [the military] that the airplane was on a visual approach and that they could resume jamming.

    > The airplane impacted terrain about 250 ft southwest of the last recorded data point at an elevation of about 9,950 ft, and about 730 ft east and 230 ft below the Capitan Mountains Summit Radio Facility, located at an elevation of about 10,180 ft.

    The image of the map from the report really helps me understand the path. It seems like the aircraft began visual approach and didn't know where it was, or didn't know about the mountain.

  • The animation at the top is worryingly misleading. The airplane that crashed was a Beechcraft twin turboprop, and the plane maneuvered a couple of times before crashing. It had 4 people inside it.

    The animation uses what looks like an airliner, and shows the jamming as a sort of bubble that directly sends the airplane into a crash.

    I found it disturbing when I looked at it, it does not represent the story well, and I think that's irresponsible.

  • thanks for your comment, i went to open TFA :)
  • Missing from the article is that, once the pilots reported to ATC that GPS was inoperable, ATC was going to have them circle to the right and guide them along the ILS approach, which would've avoided the worst of the mountains. ATC also asked the military to stop GPS jamming, which they did for a brief while... and the pilots probably noticed GPS start working again... except...

    Instead, the pilots saw the airport visually and requested a visual approach. ATC cleared them, and told the military they could resume GPS jamming, meaning any terrain awareness warning system the pilots might have had or been relying on would no longer work. The visual approach involved a left turn and descending directly over the mountains.

    blancolirio's video about this (second one, after the prelim investigation report): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dcyup4xVQuM

    He focuses on the fact that both instrument approaches were impossible under the conditions; gps jamming made RNAV impossible, and an inoperable weather broadcasting system at the destination made ILS impossible. The alternative, visual approach in mountainous terrain on a moonless night, is clearly unwise for inexperienced pilots.

    One thing he doesn't mention, though, is that ATC could have waited until the plane was on the ground to tell the military they could resume GPS jamming, knowing this was a medevac flight lacking the usual planning and level of caution of typical pilots.

  • > The alternative, visual approach in mountainous terrain on a moonless night, is clearly unwise for inexperienced pilots.

    There is not only one alternative.

    When presented with two impossible (per your telling) options for landing, you choose option C: don't.

  • > ATC could have waited until the plane was on the ground to tell the military they could resume GPS jamming

    He hinted at this when he mentioned that ATC was dealing with other flights complaining about loss of GPS and coordinating with white sands. ATC crew were probably just out of their depth and trying their best, same as the flight crew. I wonder what the experience level of the ATC crew was and how much pressure they were getting from white sands to keep the jamming up.

  • GPS is not essential to air navigation. It’s nice to have, and there are some approaches that legally require it to be operational in order to fly them (IFR procedures) but aviation has other systems in place to guide aircraft under conditions where visual flight navigation is impossible.

    In this case, IMHO, the pilots had become complacent and lax in their navigational rigor because of the fact that GPS makes a lot of the slightly less automated systems unnecessary, and people get used to that workflow.

    If the flight crew had been looking at their map and using it to inform them about the mountains in their path, fixing position by the VOR and DME, or even just a stopwatch and compass heading, they would have easily known they needed to be at a higher altitude. Not being precisely sure of their exact position, they should have at least been maintaining the minimum safe altitude for the area they knew they were in.

    But unfortunately, people get so used to looking at the shiny screen giving them effortless situational awareness that they forget all of the rules and habits that kept pilots alive for the last century before glass cockpits were a thing, and they forget that mountains are the tigers of the air, always waiting to catch pilots unaware.

    This is a useful cautionary tale not only for pilots, but increasingly for humans in general as we become accustomed to a new kind of instrument that allows us to offload a great deal of our cognitive focus to a tool that may sometimes fail.

  • I thought they were shutting down VORs to save money and relying more and more on RNAV (i.e. GPS) approaches.
  • Don't worry, our government is doing their level best to make GPS the only option for air navigation. After all, we all know that technology NEVER fails, and the sooner we can turn off all those big bad old ground radars and navigation aids, the sooner we can sell all that real estate and use the money for things that the American public desperately needs, like more corporate bailouts and bathroom security cameras.
  • To add to this, there's a good lecture called Children of the Magenta Line that discusses automation dependency: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5ESJH1NLMLs
  • Depends on the weather. A lot of approaches to airports are GPS only these days. If GPS doesn't work and you are not in VFR weather, you can't fly those approaches. In bad weather you'd be diverting to an airport that still has ILS.

    Vectoring by the controller to a visual or ILS approach still works but they'd be juggling a lot of planes. And while lots of the bigger/older airports still have ILS, many VORs and DMEs are being retired and many smaller airports don't have ILS at all.

    Denied access to GPS in a large area in bad weather would likely result in lots of flight cancellations and contingency plans getting put in motion to get anything still in the air landed safely. But controllers would get very busy and ILS runways very congested.

    Here in Europe, there have been a few cases of GPS denied areas especially closer to Russia. Mostly pilots and controllers at e.g. Helsinki airport are able to deal with this.

  • This was the partial cause of Air France 447.

    Pilots were so used to "the plane won't make a mistake" that they were not aware/not trained properly about things that are nothing to do with the FMS like frozen pitot tubes and also that the autopilot has a number of "modes" which mean you need to go back to basics like altitude, attitude and air speed.

  • > GPS is not essential to air navigation. It’s nice to have, and there are some approaches that legally require it to be operational in order to fly them (IFR procedures) but aviation has other systems in place to guide aircraft under conditions where visual flight navigation is impossible.

    This has not been the practical reality for many years for IFR flights (arguably not for VFR flight either but some of the good old boys will still argue that you should still be using a map and compass).

    In Europe the minimum requirement has been B-RNAV and aircraft are controlled with reference to intersections which have no defined relationships with underlying VORs, and an expectation of being able to navigate direct to one from any arbitrary point in space. Airliners generally get away with this because they have DME-DME disciplined INS. Smaller aircraft, well the backup is vectors from ATC.

  • Airline captain here... A visual approach to an airport in mountainous terrain on a moonless night is very risky.

    In our operation, departing to an airport with missing weather reports would not be permitted, so in a Part 121 scheduled service this flight may not have been able to dispatch legally.

    Airliners have DME/DME triangulation which allows them to achieve area navigation (RNAV) without GPS. The interference would have precluded a GPS approach but may have left the GPWS ("Terrain! Terrain!") alerts unaffected.

    In this case the ILS was not available, but only because the local altimeter setting was not available. In this case I could accept a visual approach, but use the ILS to provide lateral and vertical guidance towards the runway.

    There are many things I have learned about flying from years at the airlines that I would have had to learn the hard way at a Part 135 or Part 91 operation. One of those things would have been when to say "no".

    Take the airplane to a mountainous airport with missing weather reports at night with NOTAM'd GPS interference? No.

    Do a visual approach on a moonless night with no GPS for terrain awareness? No. Fly the ILS even if it's NOTAM'd out.

  • Would using the ILS without the local altimeter actually be a safe way to land the plane? (Ignoring whether or not ATC is allowed to give you clearance for that.) Is the requirement of a local altimeter just overly cautious?
  • It was hammered into me that moonless nights could be as or MORE dangerous to me than flying into weather - at least when you fly into a cloud you KNOW you're fucked.
  • When I used to fly in Florida in the 2005-2015ish timeframe, NOTAMs for GPS interference (it didn't say that exactly but that's what it meant) were an everyday occurrence along my path, it became boilerplate. I experienced it a few times. One moment the GPS thinks you're plodding along next to Ocala, next moment it thinks I've teleported a thousand miles away, and then it'd just quit.

    But that's what we train for. That's why aircraft and pilots have redundancy to work around any single possible point of failure and why you practice it until it becomes natural. Because of the NOTAM I'd already have a VOR tuned in, and once the GPS went inop I just fine tuned it to get a radial fix on the VOR. Also tried to never lose my bearings with my MK I Eyeballs either. No big deal.

    I feel bad for everyone that lost their lives here, but this is why competence is critical. There's a litany of errors the pilots made. And the article tries to pin a bit on the controller, but no, ultimate responsibility is on the pilot in command, FAR/AIM is clear on that.

    If these allegedly instrument rated pilots had been properly drilled by their CFI's and properly grilled during reviews and such this should've been an easy flight.

    Also, "just ask Kennedy". Wired bringing that into the conversation is perhaps relevant but not in the way I think they intended. JFK Jr lacked basic airmanship skills. His aircraft was 100% functional until the moment it impacted the ocean.

    Some professions simply can't be go-along-to-get-along social clubs. Safety culture centered on competence and performance is key.

  • What do you think Florida terrain is like in comparison to New Mexico?
  • > No big deal.

    Sure, if it's obvious it's happening, like GPS being completely knocked-out.

    If it's a GPS spoofing nudge by a few dozen metres per minute, then it's not so obvious. Enough to make a OWA drone miss its target, while also not being easily noticed by pilots.

  • Everyone seems to agree that if the GPS hadn't been inop everyone would still be alive. So to happily dismiss the deadly decisions the government made to place blame on the pilots is kind of disgraceful.
  • I guess GPS jamming was not routine for them. Had they been aware of any NOTAM regarding GPS interference, they'd be prepared, and, like you said, would have VOR setup prior to leaving the ground.