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- I'm open to the idea that some things are unnameable but would need an example :)by snapcaster
- I'll write you as soon as I canby loa_in_
- This is basically why art exists — painting, music, and poetry can point at things without having to name them. Language traps itself; other forms don't.by Drophouse
- What you say is valid only when you restrict yourself to Western definitions/conceptions of language/linguistics i.e. study of Phonetics/Morphemes/Syntax/Semantics/etc.
In Bhartrhari's Philosophy (and other Hindu philosophies) "Language" has a much broader definition which can encompass Art/Dance/Music/Painting/etc. Any medium of communication which can bring forth a "burst of meaning" (called Sphota) in one's consciousness is a language.
Natural Spoken language based on Sound (aka Sabda in Sanskrit) is considered the most fundamental since you can have languages without a written script/symbols/diagrams.
In Hindu philosophy, a "Language" is said to have four stages, only the last of which is the gross manifestation in the physical world;
1) Para - This is the latent undifferentiated potential which exists in everybody.
2) Pashyanti - This stage is where intuitive holistic meaning (of what you want to convey) exists.
3) Madhyama - This stage is where you have differentiated the thought/intention into an object and the means of representation for its communication.
4) Vaikhari - In spoken language, this is the manifest stage where you utter sentences according to established syntax/semantics to convey meaning.
Note that the first three stages are internal and only the last is the medium of expression in the physical world. It should now be obvious that the last can be any medium (eg. Dance/Painting/Music/Written-Language/Sign-Language/etc.) as long as the receiver "gets" the intended meaning.
PS: See also this comment of mine for further resources - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49486845
by rramadass - The Herzbergers' paper: https://sci-hub.ru/10.1007/BF00202726by kranner
- Thank You.
Bhartrhari (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bhart%E1%B9%9Bhari) is a pretty difficult philosopher who seems to be enjoying a revival now due to the ascendancy of AI LLMs and the question of whether they can be considered as having "consciousness".
His central idea (highly simplified) is that since Language is the only way we can name objects and discuss relations between them it is synonymous with "Reality" and "Consciousness". Sort of like how the properties of an object define that object (ADTs anyone?). One can imagine that the use of language by LLMs gives birth to appearance of both consciousness and reality as "emergent phenomena" in it. In his theory of "Sphota" he posits that "meaning bursts forth" (in consciousness) as an indivisible whole when a complete sentence/sentences is/are uttered (is this what happens when LLMs do reasoning and generate text within a "context window"?) Perhaps Epistemology and Ontology are just two sides of the same coin.
Some resources for further study;
1) Bhartṛhari’s Linguistic Idealism - https://loc.closertotruth.com/theory/bhart-hari-s-linguistic...
2) Bhartrhari on Language, Perception, and Consciousness - https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/27982/chapter-abstrac...
3) The Word And The World: India's Contribution To The Study Of Language by Bimal Krishna Matilal - https://archive.org/details/wordandtheworldindiascontributio...
4) Sabda: A Study of Bhartrhari's Philosophy of Language by Tandra Patnaik. This is particularly scholarly with the author comparing western authors (like Frege and Wittgenstein) model of language with Bhartrhari - https://test.dkprintworld.com/product/sabda/
5) The Sphota Theory of Language by Harold Coward - https://www.mlbd.in/products/sphota-theory-of-language-harol...
6) Sphota - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spho%E1%B9%ADa
by rramadass - If you can't name it you can still describe it.
But then by describing it you are committing it to a set of conditions this unnameable thing satisfies.
But then if you go beyond a narrow interpretation of that paradox and accept that naming and describing are both accomplishing the same fundamental thing, that being committing a thing to a condition (like a name) or set of conditions (like a description), you do run into the same problem.
Hmm, interesting. Now back to this E2E testing stuff I've been avoiding.
by gaoshan - Names are like variables in a function. you can name variables anything you want from a human understanding point of view (final cause), but the compiler doesnt care about that. The compiler only cares about the efficient cause of that variable in the sense of what it represents (stack/heap etc).by bwfan123
- In mathematics, there are infinitely many "computable" numbers. That is, numbers which can be describe using any mathematics available. Then there are far more "non computable" numbers, which can't be described by anything finite.
I think there is some analogy to be made here.
by LanceH - If 'it' is unnameable, there is no way to circumscribe or even describe what 'it' is. Even to show that what it refers to is an empty set, we need its description. If we use concepts like intention and extension, we can sketch out four scenarios:
extension, no intension (yes, we can point out things, which we can't describe)
extension, intension (we point out, and we describe)
no extension, intension (Yes, we can imagine and describe things vividly, but no referent in the world. Here, one can say these things exist in a Platonic world, but not the world we live in; this is where numbers, sets, ideas can exist. Neo-Platonism in Philosophy of Mathematics)
no extension, no intension (this paradox falls in this area).
by raincom - If we assume the real numbers exist, then perhaps the paradox resolves because there are uncountably many reals and only countably many nameable things, but then perhaps the paradox does not resolve because we assume ZFC is true and we can well order the reals, hence name the first unnameable real.by GPerson
- The reals can be ordered, just use x < y. I think you mean that if ZFC is true, we could enumerate unnameable reals (choose one with the axiom of choice, remove it, choose another one, etc.), but you could not enumerate them all. But it is true that you could get a "first" unnameable real.
- How is it a paradox? Isn't this just a proof that there are many unnamed things, but no unnameable ones?by curtisblaine
- See the original paper linked to here - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49478566by rramadass
- > Isn't this just a proof that there are many unnamed things, but no unnameable ones?
Where is it a proof that there are many unnamed things ? I could only see it as an argument that there are no "unnameable" things.
by bwfan123 - Agreed.
This is the stuff of magic and folklore, and neatly resolved by Ursula K. LeGuin in _A Wizard of Earthsea_.
by WillAdams - Many ancient paradoxes are not really paradoxes. Zeno's ones are resolved today with infinite series.
But this is a real one. Is it possible to describe an arbitrary real number? Almost all reals are not describable. But you cannot find a single such number.
The 'paradox' is that the search itself is self-failing - a broken strategy. Of course, now we have the language of sets and functions between them and cardinalities and we resolve this for us in a way that is meaningful. But still now you know the 'existence' of this thing? Can't be described.
It's interesting because of the property of creating with finite words universes of infiniteness.
by arjie - „Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen“
but if the thing can be interacted with, it can usually be mapped and defined and then named. But there will always be things which do not have names, at least in mathematics -- think of the real numbers.
by ngvrnd - I suppose if the number of nameable things is countable (because humans can only enumerate, and it is humans who name), then it trivially follows that some real numbers are unnameable. Which proves the existence of such entities.
This reminds me of a YouTube video I watched this week titled "A counting argument for why mind comes before matter": https://youtu.be/AtduNjJV-6E?is=nBZ9ztZsyeoVhCj1
The argument is something like the set of possible thoughts about physical objects is larger than the physical objects themselves. It feels similar in flavor to the idea of unameable objects.
There's something special about a name. The name of the God of the Bible is special. Christians are to call upon _the name_ of the Lord. We pray, hallowed by _thy name_. It is somehow denotes the summary essence of the thing being named, even if it doesn't give specific details of its characteristics.
by abnry - "Unnameable" and "unnamed" are two different things, in my opinion. Are there real numbers that are unnameable or are those just unnamed?
There are some that unnameable with my mathematical understanding, but that's not saying much.
by bryanlarsen - This reminds me of the 6 degrees of separation thing.
People tell you that you can connect more or less everyone by 6 degrees. But what struck me was, for anyone you try this with, you know their names, so you've already restricted yourself in how far out someone can be.
by lordnacho - Incidentally, it is a matter of some debate whether Bhartṛhari the philosopher and Bhartṛhari the poet are the same person or two (or more, in the case of the anthology of verses). Oral tradition holds them to be the same person, scholars have debated back and forth. I have a collection of the poems here: https://shreevatsa.net/bhartrhari/web/ (will clean it up someday)by svat
- Nice.
I have the A.N.D.Haksar, Purohit Gopinath translations of all the Satakas and Swami Madhavananda's translation of the "Vairagya Shatakam". Need to get the others ;-)
by rramadass - Bhartrihari was a king, philosopher, and poet. Scholars argue whether they were the same person or not, but I don't care, as scholars also argue about if Socrates really existed or not.
He wrote 300 verses in Sanskrit. And they are on three different topics: sensuality and pleasure, policy and ethics, and finally renunciation.
In Shringar Shatakam (100 verses on sensual pleasures), he writes:
“Casting aside envy, considering the matter carefully, let the noble ones tell us, with due propriety: Which ought one to frequent — the slopes of the mountains, or the buttocks of women whose smiles are stirred by Love?”
and
“Why all this elaborate, pointless talk? There are only two things worth attending to in this world: the fresh, wine-intoxicated youth of beautiful women, heavy with their breasts - or the forest.”
But in the final book, he realizes the folly of the senses, and writes:
“Sensual objects will inevitably leave us, even after remaining with us for a long time. What difference is there between losing them and voluntarily abandoning them? When they depart against our will, they cause unbearable anguish; but when we ourselves abandon them, they produce the infinite happiness of inner tranquility.”
Amazing character.
by __rito__ - No one argues about whether Socrates really existed. He is attested by multiple writers of the time.
The debate is solely about how much the Socrates of Plato's dialogues represents the views of the historical figure.
by TFNA - The third verse you quoted (https://shreevatsa.net/bhartrhari/web/K157.html) has a nice translation into English verse by Ryder:
The other two you quoted (https://shreevatsa.net/bhartrhari/web/K084.html https://shreevatsa.net/bhartrhari/web/K085.html) have also been translated, though IMO not as successfully.A REASON FOR RENUNCIATION Possessions leave us at the end, However long they stay; Then why not cast aside, my friend, What leaves us anyway? And if they leave against our will, The heart takes time in mending; If given willingly, they fill That heart with joy unending.by svat - https://3quarksdaily.com/3quarksdaily/2014/03/boundaries-and... This is a beautiful article on the subject.
To prove that there are unnamable concepts, he uses cantor's diagonal argument. There are countably infinite names. Any subset of these names is a concept, which is same as the powerset of the set of names, and through cantor's diagonal argument, there are uncountably infinite concepts, most which are not namable.
Yes you can take a specific concept, and name it, but there are uncountably infinitely many, so even with infinite time, you cannot name them all.
by hargup - i think there must be a scheme of naming that is uncountably infinite too.by itemize123
- Countable and Uncountable Infinities - https://philosophicaltreasures.com/countable-and-uncountable...by rramadass