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- Hacker News
- If 'it' is unnameable, there is no way to circumscribe or even describe what 'it' is. Even to show that what it refers to is an empty set, we need its description. If we use concepts like intention and extension, we can sketch out four scenarios:
extension, no intension (yes, we can point out things, which we can't describe)
extension, intension (we point out, and we describe)
no extension, intension (Yes, we can imagine and describe things vividly, but no referent in the world. Here, one can say these things exist in a Platonic world, but not the world we live in; this is where numbers, sets, ideas can exist. Neo-Platonism in Philosophy of Mathematics)
no extension, no intension (this paradox falls in this area).
by raincom - If we assume the real numbers exist, then perhaps the paradox resolves because there are uncountably many reals and only countably many nameable things, but then perhaps the paradox does not resolve because we assume ZFC is true and we can well order the reals, hence name the first unnameable real.by GPerson
- How is it a paradox? Isn't this just a proof that there are many unnamed things, but no unnameable ones?by curtisblaine
- „Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen“
but if the thing can be interacted with, it can usually be mapped and defined and then named. But there will always be things which do not have names, at least in mathematics -- think of the real numbers.
by ngvrnd - This reminds me of the 6 degrees of separation thing.
People tell you that you can connect more or less everyone by 6 degrees. But what struck me was, for anyone you try this with, you know their names, so you've already restricted yourself in how far out someone can be.
by lordnacho - Incidentally, it is a matter of some debate whether Bhartṛhari the philosopher and Bhartṛhari the poet are the same person or two (or more, in the case of the anthology of verses). Oral tradition holds them to be the same person, scholars have debated back and forth. I have a collection of the poems here: https://shreevatsa.net/bhartrhari/web/ (will clean it up someday)by svat
- Bhartrihari was a king, philosopher, and poet. Scholars argue whether they were the same person or not, but I don't care, as scholars also argue about if Socrates really existed or not.
He wrote 300 verses in Sanskrit. And they are on three different topics: sensuality and pleasure, policy and ethics, and finally renunciation.
In Shringar Shatakam (100 verses on sensual pleasures), he writes:
“Casting aside envy, considering the matter carefully, let the noble ones tell us, with due propriety: Which ought one to frequent — the slopes of the mountains, or the buttocks of women whose smiles are stirred by Love?”
and
“Why all this elaborate, pointless talk? There are only two things worth attending to in this world: the fresh, wine-intoxicated youth of beautiful women, heavy with their breasts - or the forest.”
But in the final book, he realizes the folly of the senses, and writes:
“Sensual objects will inevitably leave us, even after remaining with us for a long time. What difference is there between losing them and voluntarily abandoning them? When they depart against our will, they cause unbearable anguish; but when we ourselves abandon them, they produce the infinite happiness of inner tranquility.”
Amazing character.
by __rito__ - https://3quarksdaily.com/3quarksdaily/2014/03/boundaries-and... This is a beautiful article on the subject.
To prove that there are unnamable concepts, he uses cantor's diagonal argument. There are countably infinite names. Any subset of these names is a concept, which is same as the powerset of the set of names, and through cantor's diagonal argument, there are uncountably infinite concepts, most which are not namable.
Yes you can take a specific concept, and name it, but there are uncountably infinitely many, so even with infinite time, you cannot name them all.
by hargup