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  • What the author refers to is the ability to iterate and update the internal memory. A classic transformer based LLM can only produce the next token and never go back and update old tokens or delete them. The best thing it can do is produce thinking tokens to serialize the internal state of the final layer so that it can pass it back into the first layer.

    Just like the transformer was an advancement over LSTMs by making it possible to have perfect recall (reading every input), the only way to improve over the transformer is to build a deep equilibrium version, where the DEQ transformer is capable of updating its own memory (writing every output).

    Such a machine would be considered a linear bounded automaton (a turing machine without unlimited tape) and therefore even the human brain could not have an architectural edge over it in terms of intelligence. The human brain could only have an edge in terms of energy efficiency.

  • I've used concepts from GEB a lot in my thinking about how LLMs.

    On self-referentiality and the MU Puzzle: https://matthodges.com/posts/2025-04-21-openai-o4-mini-high-...

    On Gödelian limits of prompt-safe AI : https://matthodges.com/posts/2025-08-26-music-to-break-model...

    On the blurry line between pattern matching and reasoning: https://matthodges.com/posts/2026-08-19-bongard-problems/

    I'm glad that the author of this post ends with:

    > What’s left? Consciousness

    because when I've read (and re-read) GEB, I find the book to be much deeper than just a threshold for conversational intelligence.

  • Perhaps "true" self-referentiality was not needed. But it seems "dynamic feedback" is essential, and it seems to be adjacent to self-referentiality.

    If we look at optimization process, it first does a forward pass which produces the output. Then it looks into computations which happened during the forward pass (by that I mean backpropagation), and adjusts parameters in such a way that it might produce a better output.

    Formulated this way, it sounds like self-referentiality (system looks into what it just did!), but, of course, implementation is quite simple: it just stores activations from the forward pass. And training process includes not just code which does the forward pass, but also a full description of that computation which allows it to do a backward pass. So it's a kind of an unrolled self-referentiality which is not difficult to implement.

    Perhaps more efficient learning can be implemented if researchers figure out a trick to avoid two separate, distinct passes. Our brains don't do a global backprop and are more sample-efficient.

  • Was Hofstadter ever arguing that intelligence requires self-referentiality?

    I haven't read his stuff in a long time, but from what I recall he was saying more that something about consciousness and the sense of self is based on self-referentiality. Not that intelligence requires self-referentiality.

    I also remember having the sense that Hofstadter didn't really understand the "hard problem of consciousness". His discussions seemed to somehow confuse the sense of self with having subjective experience. But like I said, it's been a while since I read it.

  • I don't think LLMs are properly self-referential. They reference a frozen training reality, which is not itself, but the old description of itself and the old world. Being aware would probably include continuously updating yourself (learning) from experience, including experience of oneself.
  • ‘But the idea that you’d need explicit self-referentiality before you could get convincing and world-changing conversational intelligence?’ — has anyone ever formulated this actual idea or anything logically equivalent? This looks like a mighty straw man.
  • Two comments on this, trying to take a "which hypothesis fits the evidence" approach.

    First, an LLM describing its own experience is not actually proof that it has any experience to be aware of, any more than an LLM confidently asserting any other fact means that it knows that fact is true. LLMs will describe music or tastes, in spite of the fact that it's never actually heard or tasted anything, based only on what it's read about them. In the same way, "non-aware spicy autocomplete" would produce an LLM that spoke about its own experience, based only on the input it has of people speaking about their own experience.

    That said / secondly, from the little I understand of LLM architecture, I believe there are a large number of self-referential mechanisms built in. For one, nearly all transformers have a "residual layer", with various neural networks essentially reading and modifying it. This effectively forms a loop. Additionally, the "thinking" mechanism allows it to read what it's written and generate more things, which is again a loop.

    So, maybe people didn't think, "Hey, we should build some loops, maybe that will make it conscious". But if "strange loop" is what defines consciousness, there are lots of loops in there onto which such a strange loop could conceivably form.

    by gwd
  • Their lack of self reference is a core problem that undergirds a lot of faults that do occur during inference, but their breadth + the agent harness successfully covers it well, so it requires a bit of poking to witness. The “hallucination” phenomenon is exactly this. They don’t know the scope of their own knowledge, and they just say stuff, so if you go out of band, it has a higher probability emitting claims that aren’t true. RAG (I don’t mean embedding indices, but any information ingest such as an agent harness executing a search) are somewhat effective in covering for it, enough to make them very useful! But when it does go wrong, it’s generally the same reasons. It has a certain nature and sometimes you run afoul of it.

    But I suppose it doesn’t harm its reasoning!

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