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  • Hacker News
  • the inline link to the page to the report was Slashdotted for a moment (yesssssss), but here is the report directly now:

    https://www-cdn.anthropic.com/e50be2e51e7695dc4b1366a37a245a...

    by The_Blade
  • > Our investigation revealed that DeepSeek also deployed tactics similar to Moonshot’s. DeepSeek built a CoT extraction pipeline, relying on the same cross-session replay attack described above. DeepSeek also silently relayed exchanges to Claude without informing DeepSeek customers. Like GTG-16002, their customers were likely not made aware that their requests were being funneled to Claude.

    If true, would that sort of explain why Chinese Models score high on benchmarks, but not quite as capable when given real tasks?

    by nsoonhui
  • I don't get it. Surely if you were developing novel biological weapons, you would not use a hosted AI service where Anthropic can read what you are doing. And, why would you need to? Any chemistry graduate could make you dozens of highly effective, proven chemical weapons and explosives.
    by Stevvo
  • They seem to be mixing together things that are actually harmful to the public, with things that are merely harmful to their business model (which is their claim that they can grab whatever data that they want regardless of the wishes of the owners of the data and use it to improve their models, but competitors can't do that to them).
    by not2b
  • It also blocks my ability to talk about Emily Dickinson in other languages/scripts. Apparently,the poem: "Because I could not stop for Death" is too dangerous.
    by oidar
  • Misuse of AI, according to Anthropic, is when you try and use it do AI research because that would affect their business model if you're successful.
    by nullbio
  • Quite the double standard here...

      Conventional Weapons

  -We identified a cell of threat actors based in northern Yemen
  -We identified a China-based threat actor who used Claude 
  -We identified likely freelance Russia-based threat actors
  -We identified a China-based actor who used Claude’s chat
  -In this case, a Russia-based actor used Claude
  -We identified a China-based threat actor who used Claude 

  Biological misuse

  We are withholding the names of research institutions, the   countries wherein the activity took place, and the specific biological agents or research techniques involved. The individuals implicated in these case studies are working scientists. We do not assert that they intended harm, and identifying them or their labs could expose them to harm.
    by hnburnsy
  • > We discovered that Moonshot AI, the company that produces the Kimi family of models, silently forwarded customer requests to Claude, instead of processing them using Kimi. Moonshot then displayed Claude’s responses to users. These users thought they were using a Kimi model, but received responses from Claude instead.

    > DeepSeek also silently relayed exchanges to Claude without informing DeepSeek customers.

    > MiniMax built its own proxy network service through a shell company. This shell company has no obvious links to MiniMax and does not disclose its relationship to its parent company. This shell proxy network service only offers access to models developed by Anthropic and OpenAI. The service does not offer access to any Chinese models, including Minimax’s own.

    by m-hodges

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