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  • Related:

    Prime Air crash: 10+ mandatory go-around triggers were ignored [video] - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49650689 - September 2026

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xm6G7EOP5Qc

  • Nathan fielder explored the relationship between pilots in season 2 of `The Rehearsal` , as much as it was comedy this is another example where his findings might have helped
  • So many mistakes. A notable part is this:

    >> CVR: 00:15 A pilot called for a go-around.

    >> FDR: 00:15 Brakes were released at a groundspeed of 120 knots and throttles were increased to a value consistent with go-around thrust.

    >> FDR: 00:11 The throttles were reduced to idle power and the brakes were re-applied. The groundspeed was 117 knots. The throttles remained at idle, and brakes remained applied until the end of the recording.

    So they decided to go-around (i.e. do not land and climb immediately, going full thrust), then 4 seconds later changed their mind and went back to power idle and brakes (unclear how speed didn't increase).

    While they were still late in calling a go-around (they should have done it before being anywhere close to touching down due to their unstable approach), guessing those 4 seconds contributed to the disaster by a lot.

  • Spool up time is 8-10s on high-bypass turbofan engines. They tried to go around maybe 1000ft from the end of the runway? It was far far too late to even try it at that point.

    Sadly if they had made the call earlier they were going so fast they were basically at rotation speed when they touched down so could have just pulled back and gotten into the air.

    They landed flat (and the left wing refused to come down) because they tried to force the plane onto the runway. That just doesn't work. The wings are creating too much lift when you're that fast.

    Disclosure: Pilot but not ATP or Jet rated.

  • mind you those numbers are seconds until the cvr stopped recording. they were a few hundred feet from the end of the runway when they initiated the go around and like the other poster said the turbines do take time to spool up from idle. they were so far out of normal spec for landing that it was absolutely pilot fault but not at the far end of the runway. they were not stabilized on approach way further back about 5 min or so. (if you're not stabilized on approach you are required to go around). they even called for flaps 30 halfway down the runway which is also not allowed for a stabilized approach.
  • The go-around decision was far too late. Remember the engines need significant time to spool up. The decision to cancel the go-around was correct (conditional on the preceding series of terrible decisions).
    by loeg
  • > (unclear how speed didn't increase)

    Large high-bypass turbofan engines take several seconds to spool up from idle (as they would be on landing) to full thrust. The 4 seconds that the thrust levers spent in the full thrust position in this accident was not long enough.

  • > While they were still late in calling a go-around (they should have done it before being anywhere close to touching down due to their unstable approach)

    Barring a massive tailwind, they had enough groundspeed to go around at touchdown (158 kts).

    I think we'll find throttling to G-A and then aborting the G-A caused the crash. If they'd committed to landing they at least wouldn't have overshot with that much energy. If they'd decided to G-A even at 00:15, they may have been well within margin to take back off.

  • > unclear how speed didn't increase

    How can you comment as if you are knowledgeable enough about aviation to speak on this with authority, but you aren't aware that turbofan engines don't have instant throttle response and need time (up to 8 seconds) to spool up? I think a little more restraint is warranted in something like this if you don't know something that basic.

    You can actually do the math to work backwards and approximate how much thrust the engines were producing during that time, which was about 15,000 lbf (vs ~120,000 lbf max thrust for a 767-300er) which reduced how quickly they were decelerating by... Maybe a few % or so. But they didn't start accelerating yet. They would have in another second or two, however.

    I'll agree that they should have gone around far earlier; getting non-spurious GPWS callouts on final because you're trying to dive and find the glideslope is... Crazy, and configuring landing flaps over the numbers is also crazy, and so is landing 10-20kts faster than the highest possible Vref value for the type, and everything else. But that's fairly obvious...

  • Looking at it from the glass-half-full perspective, I'm impressed that pilots declare go-around as often as they do. As someone who sometimes can't decide whether I should declare a production incident (even if it's not my change), I wonder if it's possible to learn that decisiveness.
  • It's a direct consequence of the stakes involved. It's literally a life-or-death decision and the rules pilots abide by are written in blood.

    Production incidents are comparatively trivial, irrelevant issues.

    by Mawr
  • Way better to abort and try again, than commit and run the risk of something going wrong. What harm is there in doing a go around if you can? They have plenty of fuel to try multiple times, and have clearance to do so if required.
  • That's why there are standards that define when to go around. If you aren't stable, on glide slope, at proper airspeed, and the before-landing checklist complete at 1000 feet, a go-around is mandatory. There's no choice at that point (or should not be).
  • > can't decide whether I should declare a production incident

    A supportive culture encourages you to declare early at the first sign you feel something isn't right.

    The fact you're struggling to decide means it should be declared but you feel some negative force if ends up not as serious as you think.

    A supportive culture will work with you and if necessary down grade the priority if it can wait until a regular release cycle.

    It's the same rot that set into Telstra https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49534127

  • > I wonder if it's possible to learn that decisiveness.

    If the culture allows for it, yes.

    On final my instructor was talking about the next approach. I heard the words 'go around' and immediately executed one. He realized that (1) that conversation was unnecessary at that phase of the flight and (2) to not use those words unless he wants me to immediately go around :)

    After soloing, I sometimes report that I had to go around because I didn't like how the approach or landing was looking like. I got praised for it every time.

    So yes, it's all culture.

  • > There was no indication in the recorded data that speed brakes or thrust reversers were deployed.

    I don't know anything about flying. Is this normal? Doesn't sound like it, but I don't know why the pilots would not have used these things that sound useful.

  • Depending on the plane they need the wheels to have sufficient weight on them first. Also strangely the flaps 30 and flaps 40 call outs do not match.
  • > I don't know anything about flying. Is this normal?

    Not deploying thrust reversers is normal, not all situations require them. But brakes are terrible when the wings are still flying, so spoilers (if armed as they should) automatically deploy when all wheel sensors report the aircraft is on the ground, so that there will be more weight on the wheels and the brakes can work properly.

  • Someone who flew this exact airframe wrote that this plane "likes to float when empty, so if you’re not firm with putting it down, especially with those winds, it’ll just keep floating in ground effect."

    https://www.reddit.com/r/aviation/comments/1w9jsrb/put_toget...

    I'm not a pilot but from my understanding there's a lot of failsafes to ensure things that slow the plane down only trigger when the plane is actually on the ground. Considering that the left gear touched down at 0:19 and pilot called for TOGA at 0:15 they didn't stand a chance.

  • Take this with all the salt that random third-party guesses about a still-in-investigation event should be taken with -- think fully salt-cured ham -- but it looks like the landing was with a quartering tail wind, and the upwind (left) gear never really got weight on it; the wheel bogie needs to be straightened by weight against both the front and back wheels to register weight-on-wheel, and the auto-brake systems need positive weight-on-wheels from at least one redundant sensor on each of the three gear to engage. Came down hot, and basically skimmed with one wheel partially off the ground for some, most, or all of the way down the runway, preventing the braking systems from kicking in.
  • The lack of contact of the left wheels on the ground, which the Weight of Wheel sensor deployment depends on, as in both wheels being grounded, which the auto-speed brakes/thrust reversers depend on, worsened the whole situation as the crew seems to be unaware why they weren't losing speed after they'd 'landed'.

    Every single thing they could do wrong at, they did.

  • > [01:42] A pilot called for flaps to be set to 20 degrees, and the other pilot cautioned they were too fast. The other pilot made additional comments regarding the aircraft’s excessive speed throughout the remainder of the recording. There was not a consistent verbal response to the comments about speed

    The interaction here is eerily similar to the pilot interactions preceding the 1997 Korean Air Flight 801 (B747) disaster in Guam [1]. It's not clear based on the NTSB update if the Captain was ignoring the First Officer or the other way around.

    [1]: https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Korean_Air_Flight_801_-_Aircr...

  • This has all the hallmarks of a "gethomeitis" disaster, where the urge to push on overrides better judgment about going around and doing things properly.
    by YPPH
  • A bad driver never misses an exit.
  • Pilot here but not ATP or Jet rated.

    When you try to land with too much energy the airplane refuses. When you get within a wingspan or two of the ground then ground effect starts giving you more and more lift. That plus excess speed means the airplane simply will not come down.

    To force it down you lower the nose but that can end up castering on the nose wheel, starting a PIO event (pilot-induced oscillation), or as in this case the left wing just refused to stop flying. The "quartering tailwind" is a red herring. The jet was well within its tailwind limits - most of the wind was crosswind at that point and the tailwind contribution wasn't anywhere near enough to explain what happened. When you get above glide slope things get worse as you now need to lose altitude but that increases your speed. Even if you get the speed under control if you come at the runway with a 1700-2500fpm descent rate inertia can slam you into the runway.

    They were coming in with way too much speed. They leveled off and got above glide slope because they were trying to bleed off enough speed to get within flap speed - flaps give you more drag which they desperately needed.

    I made the transition this year into a much higher performance airplane and even going from a Cessna 172 to an A36 TN Bonanza the difference is stark. You must be way further ahead of the airplane in the Bonanza or you will find yourself screaming into the airport at 170kts when your landing speed is more like 80kts. And discover you are above flap and gear extension speed with all power taken out - thus without a good way to slow down.

    Transport category jets are that times 100. You absolutely cannot get behind the aircraft. You plan your descents. You begin them much earlier. You pull power earlier. You add drag before speed runs away.

    Above all else when you're barreling in 40kts above landing speed you call a go-around and try it again. It is way too late to fix it.

    This accident started 30 minutes before they touched the tarmac. A complete failure of planning, of execution, and of ADM (to admit the problem and go-around).

  • The thing I’ve come to appreciate between my first few days in a sim, a lot of sim time, and then actual time behind a yoke is that like a lot of things, landing is peaceful and easy if you’ve done all the prep ahead of time. Which is precisely your point.

    The further in advance you cut power, descend, and get your airspeed set, you’ll find you have plenty of time to go over your checklists, mentally rehearse, and get configured. By the time you’re touching down, the plane wants to be on the ground.

    If you’re coming in high and fast, you have significantly abbreviated time. And you’re constantly fighting airspeed and altitude. If both are high, trying to lose one just increases the other. It’s a losing battle and one you’re fighting on an accelerated and accelerating time frame.

  • Did fly jets, although not transport-class ones. Just to hammer home that everything here is correct, and the common thread through all aircraft types is disciplined execution.

    You fly an approach on airspeed and/or angle of attack, and on glideslope. Period. You're either there or you're correcting to get there, and you're correcting at a point that you don't need huge oh-my-God corrections in close. If you can't do that, sucks to be you, take your waveoff like a real man or woman, and next time suck less.

  • It was an overrun accident of an Amazon cargo plane that killed 5 people: https://www.cnn.com/2026/09/06/us/boeing-miami-plane-overrun...
  • The details of course matter; but the overarching principle put on stark display here is that if you don’t meet stabilized approach criteria (on-speed, on-glidepath, minimal necessary flight control deflections) at the 1000 ft AGL gate, go around. Yes grey areas exist but this approach never became stabilized. The whole approach was a missed opportunity to go around.

    I am a pilot; and although I don’t fly large transport category aircraft, this sort of procedural discipline makes all the difference no matter what you fly.

  • If there are factors that need to be met it seems like a red indicator light should trigger a go around.