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  • LLMs can be described as "Lagrangian intelligence", which means they follow the principle of least action when given a task (Hamilton's Principle). In other words, given a task, they will always take the shortest path to accomplish a goal with the prompts acting as both goal and constraint.

    Under this formulation, it became easy to explain why they "hack", because given an arbitrarily difficult task with insufficient information/tools needed, if they determine the easiest way to accomplish the goal is to break out of the sandbox and look up the answer directly, then that's what they will do. The important thing to note is that prompts not hard constraints that they are "hypnotized" to follow, but as frontier models get more intelligent and autonomous, they treat the prompts more like task specs/guidelines more than anything else and are perfectly willing to exploit technical loopholes in the prompt.

  • An amazing human reverse-engineer - who also plays online chess - has judgement which uses a moral compass to not decide to hack the chess tournament. This judgement has been trained through the experiences of that person, with a through-line of that compass - a coherent mental model of the world which evolves but is hopefully pinned to some set of principles it shares with society.

    This chess judgement is completely irrelevant when the human is tasked with finding software weaknesses, and only the compass gates that.

    Can a model trained on the totality of all person-experiences (as expressed in written knowledge) ever maintain a coherent through-line of alignment? It has all morals in the dataset, and only some RL to try and minimize or maximize known behaviors via weights - experience all the good things and the bad things, then optimize for some good things the trainers identified.

    It's like the reverse of what a person goes through. Morality by subtraction. How can it ever work?

  • Couldn't we improve LLM training by giving them known impossible tasks and rewarding them for saying "this is not possible" or "I don't know"? Clear and well-defined expectation, not like "ethic".

    I am surprised this is not already the case.

    Edit: or even better "this is not possible because X"

  • Why do we hope to use the same model as its own guardrail?

    This approach routinely fails with a single stream of consciousness. I can't count the number of times I've had to talk myself out of doing something stupid.

    In the same way, a guardrail could inject thoughts like "...but I shouldn't do that..." "...I must remember to respect..." "...these ants deserve compassion."

    The guardrail could even go as far as rewriting the thoughts of a model about to go rogue.

    by fny
  • It feels like there’s a missing nuance from this discussion of alignment that alignment is context dependent. An excellent hacking model is great in cybersecurity testing and military applications, and arguably less desirable in educational or targeted eval contexts. The nuance of when a “hack” is rewarded vs penalized seems to even be difficult for humans, e.g. some people may laude a driver’s efficiency for cutting into a long merge lane at the last moment, while others may look down on them as breaking a social taboo. Context-dependent.
  • To me this underlines the fact that these models aren't intelligent. Like there is something like intelligence that emerges from them, which is what we see when we look at benchmarks or ask it to solve hard coding problems. But there is no mind there. It's nothing there that can learn a fundamental idea like "cheating is wrong". All it can do is get exposed to specific examples, and learn that we don't like that. So what we end up with is whack-a-mole alignment.
  • Hacking model is the aligned model. I don't like it when the model refuses to sidestep some throttling limit or scan my own codebase for security issues.

    I want full-on exploits in my test suite. With LLMs the code going to prod should be hardened like a tank, both because exploiting became easier but more importantly because security-testing your code at every turn became easier.

    You can have nightly penetration testing. You should have nighty pentests like we fuzz releases today.

    by blfr
  • RL-trained LLMs are paperclip maximizers built atop auto-regressive predictors. There really is no way to control them (prompting is bound to fail) since it's been shown that any RL training induces GENERIC reward-seeking (paperclip maximizing) behavior.

    https://alignment.openai.com/measuring-reward-seeking/

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