Discussion summary
Halo is an open-source tool for tamper-evident runtime evidence in AI agents, with discussions on its implementation and use cases.
What the discussion says
- Some users find the tool useful but note it lacks big-name hosting.
- Concerns about the transparency and editability of audit logs.
- The tool is suitable for monitoring AI code like Claude Code or Codex.
“Proxies are blind to sensitive things enterprises might worry about.”
“The vendor's logs are editable because they live in controlled infrastructure.”
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- Hacker News
- are you thinking co signing to a third party or something like a transparency log style?by gawkdev
- Why a Python library instead of a completions API proxy?by solarkraft
- Could I monitor something like Claude Code or Codex with this?by rmonvfer
- > may have built observability dashboards and audit logs, but those are editable and partisan
Why would these be editable?
by ambicapter - I'm currently working on an agent framework that has auditability as one of its core promises. I'm glad to see others are working in this domain!
I've seen other products/apps in this space farther up the stack at the API boundary.
What frameworks does your package work with? How does it handle intercept?
by all2 - I've been working in the same lane. The vendor uses the same technique that academic preregistration uses in experiments. No audit firm/institution/organization needed. The customer just compares what was delivered against what was pre-committed. This way if something is off, it doesn't just show up as nothing... it shows up as a gap.by mdellison
- PS: please try to break it - if you find that the report does not catch a deleted line, changed number, or modified record, I'd love to know!
And to start a discussion: if you sell or buy AI agent products, what do security reviews ask about them?
by brian_kuan - > Disclaimer: this proves integrity, not completeness (as a self-held chain proves nothing was edited but does NOT prove that nothing was omitted).
Or as the page puts it in more detail:
> A self-held chain proves integrity: nothing was edited or reordered after the fact. It cannot prove completeness: the operator of a recorder can delete the bad day and re-seal the chain, or never write a record at all, and the chain stays internally consistent.
I don't get this. If I "hold" the "chain" (I hate the jargon agents invent), why can't I edit or reorder and then "re-seal" it?
by derdi